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ABSTRACT 
Romania’s overall economic performance during the first ten years of transition can 
be termed so far as disappointing: the country has not been able to deliver steady 
growth, low unemployment and low inflation. This paper focuses on the effectiveness 
of monetary mechanisms and policies during this period. Emphasis is set also on the 
exchange rate mechanism. The first part of the text develops a short introduction to 
relevant monetary theory in the transition context. In the second part, we analyse the 
stylised facts pertaining to Romanian economy and put forward some weaknesses of 
its banking system and monetary policies. The conclusion presents a set of policy 
recommendations in order to achieve disinflation . 
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 1. Introduction. 
Romania was invited to start accession negotiations with the European Union 
in December 1999. Although an official accession date has not yet been decided, a 
realistic forecast would set it not before 2007. By this date the monetary integration 
challenge will be faced, a process that may last a few more years. In the current 
decade, Romania should undertake important structural transformations in order to set 
its economy in line with Western ones. Fast integration requires the fulfilment of a set 
of social, political and economic criteria. Essential economic criteria are a low 
inflation rate, low public debt and deficits, low interest rates and a stable currency 
against the Euro. Less explicit, but also very important, gaps vis-à-vis the Western 
partners should be reduced, in order to be able to comply with obligations related to 
the participation to the Western club.  
Unfortunately, given a limited number of instruments and resources, these 
goals may sometimes be conflicting and policy choices should take into account the 
trade-off between them. Also, during the decade, the relative importance of the 
various objectives may change and would require an adjustment of policies and 
mechanisms. 
In most developed countries, the management of monetary parameters and the 
exchange rate is the responsibility of central banks. Sometimes the central bank 
determines on its own the policy objectives to be achieved, some other times the 
government has a say in this process. Following the Fed example, in the last twenty 
years, all developed countries have endowed their central bankers with powerful tools 
that allow them to control the key variables in the money market. This was the full 
truth about setting “independent” central banks: not only to give central banks 
political independence, but also to cut any direct link between state deficits and 
monetary base. The significant progress of the Western world in the fight against 
inflation can be attributed to a large extent to the implementation of more efficient 
mechanisms for controlling money supply. 
Macroeconomic performances depend also on the design and goals of the 
exchange rate mechanism. One may order exchange rate mechanisms in keeping with 
the cost of changing the parity from the most to the least rigid: dollarisation or 
euroisation ? currency board regimes ? credible peg (or fixed rate) ? non-credible 
peg ? managed float ? fully flexible rates. The 1997 Asian crisis has much eroded 
the confidence of policymakers in the developing world in the virtues of fixed rates 
and other crawling pegs under the current international financial arrangements and 
rules. It also put forward the increased scope for speculative lending and speculative 
currency attacks in a world of increased capital mobility (Krugman, 2000). Not only 
modern communication technology allows very rapid international transfers of funds 
but also, in the context of a liberalisation Zeitgeist in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s, both developed and many developing countries have removed all/most of 
capital controls and restrictions in the last twenty years. 
Whereas flexible managed rates is still the rule in practice, there is a rising 
advocacy of super-fixed exchange rate mechanisms – against the background of rising 
discontent with the working of the international financial system. Some economists 
favour currency boards (Rivera-Batiz and Sy, 2000; Gulde, Kähkönen and Keller, 
2000) and even dollarisation (Berg and Borensztein, 2000; LeBaron and McCulloch 
2000). Gulde, Kähkönen and Keller (2000) argue that Eastern European countries 
should adopt currency boards not only during the intermediate period before joining 
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the EU, but should also maintain this mechanism during the two-year test period 
which precedes the adoption of the single currency.1 Under such arrangement, in a 
world of increased capital mobility, the country actually transfers the control over 
monetary policy into the hands of the central bank issuing the reference currency (that 
is, the Fed or the ECB). That would allow the small country to “import” the 
credibility of this institution. 
The basic rationale against fixed exchange rate regimes may be traced back to 
the pioneering work of Milton Friedman (1953). According to his view, when a 
country is hit by an adverse and specific output shock, the real exchange rate should 
depreciate to restore competitiveness. While this may be achieved by a reduction in 
the domestic price level, the price adjustment process may be too costly or too slow; 
an adjustment of the nominal rate would achieve the same result less harmfully. In the 
same line of reasoning, super-fixed exchange rate regimes may not be consistent with 
the smooth structural real appreciation of the currency required by the would-be 
productivity catch-up in the sector of tradable goods (Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997 
develop on the Belassa-Samuelson principle as applied to transition economies). 
One should notice that fully flexible rates are more a theoretical construct than 
a real life experience. Indeed, central banks firmly supporting this principle, like the 
Fed or the National Bank of Japan, and more recently the ECB, are far from letting 
their currency being determined by market forces only. As put forward by Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000), they follow some kind of “managed float” regime, given that the 
monetary policy is not indifferent to changes in the international value of the domestic 
currency. This leads to a relatively low variance in the exchange rate and a higher 
variation in reserves and short-term rates. The two authors argue that sometimes the 
difference between “managed float” and “not-credible peg” is quite negligible. Under 
a not-credible peg, the government announces an exchange rate target, but would 
discretionary change it, quite frequently. 
This paper aims to introduce some basic elements of an analysis of monetary 
and exchange rate policies, from a perspective related to the economic reality of 
transition economies; it analyses the role played by monetary policy in Romania so 
far, the factors that contributed to poor inflation performances and suggests some 
possible ways of improving the effectiveness of its monetary policy and achieving 
disinflation. Special emphasis is placed on the relationship between monetary policy 
and the exchange rate regime. The paper has a clear macroeconomic and financial 
bias. Of course, many microeconomic, institutional, political and cultural factors may 
have been brought into the picture, as there are many relevant variables during such a 
complex phenomenon as transition. But focusing on one dimension at one time would 
limit the risk of hiding or omitting the essential mechanisms and relationships. In 
particular, it should be noticed that the paper does not explicitly address the question 
of slow growth in Romania. If we implicitly assume that moderate inflation and a 
stable currency could favour growth, other aspects, as the relationship between 
investment and savings, the improvement of Romanian firm competitiveness in the 
world market, the resource reallocation toward dynamic firms and sectors are not 
dealt with. 
The next section briefly recalls some basic difficulties that policy reform faced 
at the beginning of the transition process in the most centralised economies. Section 3 
comments on the relationship between monetary and fiscal discipline under various 
                                                 
1 It is however not obvious which would be then the role of this test period, if the exchange rate reveals 
no information about economic performances and policies. 
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exchange rate mechanisms. Section 4 analyses the risks of speculative attacks that 
may occur under fixed exchange rates regime. Sections 5 to 9 analyse in depth the 
Romanian monetary and exchange rate mechanisms and point to the main factors that 
harmed the effectiveness of disinflation policy in the late nineties. The conclusion and 
some policy implications are presented in the last Section. 
 
FIRST PART: THEORY 
2. Inflation and monetary policy in a centralised transition economy 
At the beginning of the transition process, many international experts and 
organisations viewed the basic transition economy as a standard economy hit by a 
large adverse supply shock, which have to solve simultaneously a problem of 
monetary overhang and of declining output. Ten years later, everyone seems to agree 
that the initial approach to reform in these countries built on over-simplified 
representations of the reality. Some older and recent criticism has put forward the 
intrinsic ineffectiveness of orthodox reforms in highly disorganised economies and 
advocate the need to enforce “institutions” (the state and the market included) as a 
necessary precondition to successful reform (Blanchard, 1997; Stiglitz, 1999; 
Rodrick, 1999). 
In this section, we would like to briefly comment on the factors that might 
have justified a doze of chronic inflation during the first years of transition (different 
from the corrective inflation that accompanied price liberalisation in a context of 
monetary overhang). We describe a hypothetical economy, whose fundamental 
features are emphasised in an extreme way. The basic framework refers to a country 
that did not benefit from early programs of partial and gradual reform in the late 
1980s. The purpose of this section is to tell the inflation story in a straightforward 
way, then to investigate whether this story is still true. 
Formerly socialist economies were highly centralised: in general, a given 
commodity or service was produced by a few huge state-owned firms; some 
commodities were produced by only one firm and sometimes, a given firm had only 
one buyer for its products. (Such organisation made central plan easier to be set up). 
Imagine then the chain of production of a final consumption good. If one of the firms 
got out of the market, the whole chain would collapse. Of course, this is quite an 
extreme characterisation, but it is not a very unrealistic picture for highly centralised 
countries like Romania, Bulgaria or Russia, at least at the beginning of the transition 
process. Intuitively, one may see then why governments were keen on letting burst 
some of the firms. 
To produce, firms need energy and other inputs. While the other inputs are 
produced at home, energy is bought in the world market (of course, some other 
essential inputs would also be bought overseas). Thus, any devaluation would have 
deteriorated the balance sheet of the representative firm. If the capital market is not 
functioning well, the representative firm will not be able to borrow against future 
income and would buy less of the other inputs. Consequently, the devaluation would 
imply a reduced output and even the exit of the firm of the market. In order to avoid 
the collapse of production chains, governments in transition economies have initially 
subsidised the firms in trouble (gave them money or blocked energy prices). The 
increased public deficit was in general financed by the central bank. Often with a lag, 
the consecutive increase in money supply led to an increase in prices, which put 
additional pressure on the exchange rate. Even if the central bank had striven to keep 
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the parity constant, the loss of competitiveness entailed reserve depletion and, in the 
end, the currency has to be devalued. A new inflation cycle is at work. 
Today, the economic landscape has changed much. Most governments have 
banned direct subsidies to firms. However, in the less advanced countries along the 
reform path, there is still a massive problem of tax arrears, where the government 
tolerates the accumulation of unpaid taxes of the firms that seem to face financial 
difficulties. The resulting deficit is in general monetized, either directly or through the 
commercial banks that would refinance themselves against treasury bonds as 
collateral.2 In addition there is a “hunger” for inflation, as the latter becomes a 
perverse way of stabilising arrears in real terms, for otherwise the economy would 
suffocate itself by not being able to pay wages and critical inputs. 
One may argue that the rationale for firm support has not changed: there 
would be still a need to keep some firms in the production chains under perfusion, 
given a risk of overall collapse. However, the old argument has lost much of its force 
today. Firstly, increased international openness allowed foreign suppliers to become a 
sensible alternative to domestic firms. More important, transition economies have 
undertaken an important process of de-monopolisation: many private firms have 
entered the market and are today serious competitors for former national champions. 
Capital markets have also widened and deepened, thus providing firms that face 
temporary payment difficulties the needed relief. In this context, an inefficient 
supplier may be replaced at a relatively low social cost (i.e. there would be no 
undesired spillover). 
While at the origin of the inflationist cycle stood the will of the government to 
protect the weak firms, today the initiative seems to sit with the firms themselves, 
which, in a quest for tax exemptions, try to hide the true costs and claim the state 
support. This non-cooperative strategy is dominant, insofar as the firm which does not 
play defection in the arrears game will be penalised (Daianu and Vranceanu, 2000). 
One could notice that this vicious circle that perpetuates inflation, tax arrears and a 
weak currency could also be related to lack of progress with restructuring and slow 
resource reallocation, factors that hamper long-term growth. 
As an upshot, consistent and well designed monetary and exchange rate 
policies and mechanisms, backed by additional structural and institutional reforms, 
could help today terminating inflation and inflation expectations without putting 
additional strain on the productive sector. 
 
2.1. A simple explanation for chronic inflation in a disequilibrium 
economy 
 
Transition economies inherited a very distorted economic structure, where the 
forced development of heavy industries penalised growth in the service sector and in 
the consuming goods producing sector (this dynamics was compounded by massive x-
inefficiency). 
 
After 1991, trade and price deregulation opened the path for gradual resource 
reallocation from inefficient to efficient sectors and activities. The structure of these 
economies is now changing slowly. One important driving force for labour 
                                                 
2 In Romania, by mid-2000 tax and inter-firm arrears were more than 35% of GDP. When firms use 
actual liquidity for paying wages and some taxes, inter-firm arrears emerge as temporary quasi-inside 
money, which also fuels inflationary expectations (Daianu, 1994). See also the study of Pinto et al. 
(2000) on tax arrears in Russia. 
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reallocation is the wage differential across sectors. Those sectors where labour 
demand is relatively strong and labour resources are relatively scarce should record 
higher wages than sectors where labour is abundant and demand is weak. 
 
The market environment in South-Eastern transition economies has also 
specific features. On the one hand, large manufacturing firms still benefit of 
significant market power; it is well know that such a market environment allows them 
to fix prices by adding a profit margin to unit costs (the margin itself depending on the 
elasticity of the market demand curve). On the other hand, the wage bargaining 
process in Romania includes a strong indexation component, where wage increases 
depend on “programmed inflation”. Most often, governments supported trade union 
wage claims and followed the indexation policy in the public sector. These are basic 
building blocks of a standard WS/PS model (Layard, Jackman and Nickell, 1991). 
 
When wage differentials are combined with a WS/PS model, a simple 
explanation for chronic inflation in Romania may be put forward. For instance, let us 
assume that the economy is made up of two sectors, the “expanding sector” 2 and the 
“shrinking sector” 1. Under (explicit or implicit) indexation, for a given 
unemployment rate, nominal wages in the shrinking sector increase proportional to 
inflation: 
wt t
1
1= −λπ      (1) 
 
where  is the indexation coefficient. A higher indexation coefficient 
signals a more significant bargaining power of the unions. The assumption λ<1 
implies that real wages fall in the declining sector. 
λ ≤ 1
Nominal wages in the developing sector rise faster than in the shrinking sector. 
We assume that they are also indexed on inflation, but workers may also ask and get a 
share of the productivity gains. Actually, marginal productivity in this sector is higher 
than the marginal wage and workers bargain for a share of the net profit of the 
company. Therefore wages can rise faster than in the shrinking sector; they can rise 
faster than the CPI, to the extent workers get more out of expected net profit. To the 
extent productivity grows, their wages further increase too. This strategy of sharing 
the productivity gain may also be optimal for firms in this sector, in order to motivate 
the workforce. Then wage increases in this sector are: 
 
wt t
2
1= +−λπ µqt
ε t
t
 + zt     (2) 
 
where µ<1 is the share of the productivity gain accruing to workers and zt<0 is 
the speed of the marginal wage catching up with the marginal productivity. 
The inflation rate is a weighted average of wage increases in the two sectors, 
to which we add an exogenous shock, related to monetary influences that have not 
been explicitly addressed here. For instance, expansive monetary policy is likely to 
push up wages (it is not clear that it raises demand, but higher inflation is certain). 
 
π α αt t tw w= − + +( )1 1 2      (3) 
π λπ αµ εt t tq= + +−1 +zt   (4) 
 
The steady state solution (long-run inflation rate) is: 
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π αµ ελ* =
+ +
−
q z Et t t
1
     (5) 
 
where E[-] is the expectation operator. Of course, a more detailed model would also 
put forward the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
 
This very simple model shows that under partial indexation, the long-run 
inflation rate may be quite high, and that the impact of small shocks may be 
magnified. This indexation is not necessarily explicit; it may be a kind of social norm 
that emerged as a normal response of the economic system to a long spell of high 
inflation; this norm can be reinforced by high inflation operating as a device (as an in-
built stabiliser3) for keeping arrears constant in real terms. 
Alternatively, we may interpret indexation as expectational inertia, where a 
mechanism similar to that described here-above is now build in the expectation 
structure of the economy. To show this, it will suffice to replace πt-1 by E tπ , then 
solve equation (4) for πt = E  at the rational expectations equilibrium. In this 
context, actual and expected inflation coincide, and can be interpreted in the 
Romanian context as some kind of a programmed target inflation.. 
tπ
While wage differentials are a natural and necessary phenomenon in a 
restructuring economy, indexation, be it explicit or implicit is not. It  has emerged to 
protect worker purchasing power from being eroded by high inflation, but its role is 
no longer granted, especially where wages bear hardly any relationship to productivity 
dynamics. The fight against inflation in a transitional economy should also address 
this topical issue. 
The model does not capture inflation as a way of providing implicit subsidies 
to the sectors which resist change. Thus, a more complex model would shaw workers 
in the expanding sectors oppose restructuring to the extent their wages would increase 
at a smaller pace, if more labour is flowing into their sector and a reduced share of the 
profits accrue to workers (Daianu, 1995, Fourçans and Vranceanu, 1994). In order to 
break the deadlock, these workers would have to realise that it is them who subsidise 
the workers in the inefficient sectors; they would have to compare what they lose via 
implicit subsidies (the inflation tax ) with falling wages (unless productivity grows). 
 
3. Monetary discipline, fiscal discipline and the exchange rate mechanism 
As mentioned in the introductory section, in the last few years, notably after 
the 1997-1998 Asian and Russian financial crisis, an increasing number of economists 
argued that the recourse to super-fixed exchange rate mechanisms, like currency 
boards and, more extreme, dollarization (euroization) would allow the countries 
victims of high inflation and excessive currency instability to import the discipline of 
the reference currency. 
In the past, currency boards were mainly to be found in the UK colonies. 
Today, only a few countries use such schemes (to mention only Argentina, Hong 
Kong, Bulgaria and Estonia), in general as a solution of last resort to excessive price 
and financial instability. Under a currency board, a fixed conversion rate between the 
local currency and a foreign one is decided and the domestic monetary base (cash and 
bank deposits) is 100% (and more) backed by low risk assets denominated in the 
                                                 
3 See section 2 
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foreign currency. The currency board has no right to issue central bank money against 
any domestic assets.4 
In general, currency boards have contributed to bring down high inflation 
quite fast, but recorded less impressive results in terms of stabilising output in the 
aftermath of major adverse shocks (Chang and Velasco, 2000). The major difficulties 
faced by Argentina after the 1998 crisis until today (July 2001) point at the main risks 
associated to currency boards. Pegging the peso to the dollar helped Argentina to 
bring down inflation sharply. The reverse of the medal comes with dollar appreciation 
at the end of the nineties. This deteriorated strongly Argentinean competitivity on 
Latin American markets, in particular with respect to Brazil, its main competitor. 
With falling exports, despite the slow growth recorded in 1999 and 2000, the trade 
deficit increased and required increasing external financing. Although devaluation did 
not seem possible, investors become increasingly nervous about the possibility of the 
Argentinean government to service its debt. In June 2001, the government, supported 
by the IMF, managed to convert some short term into long-term debt, and by July, the 
peg to the dollar was partly relaxed (exporters get a subsidy, while importer pay a 
tax); it is also planned to use as reference money a synthetic currency, composed of 
dollars and euros. But the risk of liquidity has not yet disappeared.  As an upshot, 
Argentinean experience emphasises that a small country takes major risks from 
pegging its currency to a country which is not its dominant trading partner, even if 
devaluation is not an option. 
Bulgaria adopted an idiosyncratic5 currency board in July 1997 as the main 
building block of a resolute stabilisation programme. Inflation fell dramatically, from 
580% in 1997 to less than 1% in 1998. Although the growth rate was of some 3% per 
year during the period 1998-2000, the unemployment rate has kept on increasing, to 
reach 18% in 2000.6 Another major risk for Bulgaria is related to the large and 
increasing foreign debt. 
Gulde, Kähkönen and Keller (2000) point that by ruling out the possibility to 
finance the deficit by money creation (that is, no central money can be issued against 
treasury bonds), a currency board would set a strong constraint on spendthrift 
governments and would bring about more fiscal discipline7. This argument applies as 
such for closed economies, but less so in a global environment, according to the 
famous Mundell-Fleming paradigm. 
Let us consider two identical countries, with the same initial fiscal stance and 
the same risk of default on the sovereign debt. One country has a currency board, the 
other a central bank under a fixed exchange rate mechanism. We assume that under a 
currency board the devaluation risk is zero (but the rationale would not change if we 
assume that it is only lower than under fixed rates). Additional public borrowing 
involves small increases in interest rates above the world rates, which would lead to 
inflows of capital. This additional foreign capital not only allows financing the deficit 
but also would increase the currency reserves of the board, the monetary base and the 
                                                 
4 Under dollarization, the country loses the seigniorage income, but the credibility of the fixed parity is 
much increased, given the very high costs of reversing the process. 
5 The Bulgarian monetary institution lacks an important feature of basic currency boards. The 
government account is held at the Currency Board. In case of a deficit, this would lead automatically to 
an increase in the monetary base. See Miller (1999). 
6 By not underestimating the size of unemployment, this should not necessarily be seen as a signal of 
poor performance: the impossibility of the central bank to lend to the government has limited the 
spending possibilities of the government and, thus, put an end to state subsidies to under-performing 
firms. In turn, this may have pushed with much needed restructuring. 
7 But not necessarily financial discipline in the economy, where firms may continue to run big arrears. 
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money supply. The automatic response of the currency board consists in 
accommodating any increase in public spending. Ceteris paribus the public deficit 
and the current account deficit increase in pair. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, and under imperfect information of 
private agents on policymaker’s priorities, a government truly committed to zero 
devaluation policy is in a worse situation than with a currency board. While this 
government still cannot have an autonomous monetary policy, the risk of devaluation 
is positive and adds as a premium on interest rates. This discourages investment, 
output and employment and further increases the devaluation risk. For a given fiscal 
deficit, output is lower under fixed exchange rates than under the currency board 
regime.8 
To sum up, under a currency board, monetary policy cannot be used to foster 
demand and employment, but fiscal policy is a powerful expansionary instrument. 
High unemployment countries, like those from Southeast Europe may thus be tempted 
to recourse to the fiscal stimulus in order to reduce high unemployment, but this 
endeavour may prove detrimental over the longer term if it undermines overall policy 
credibility (due to too high public deficits and related high interest rates). In addition, 
by the moment of the accession to the EU, successive periods of high deficits may 
raise a problem of debt and debt reduction, hard to be tackled in one stroke. There is 
another risk that would occur if governments rely too much on fiscal polices; as 
suggested above, above a certain level of indebtedness, the default risk can become 
significant and further penalise investment and growth. To counter these risks, 
additional limits on fiscal deficits, of the kind laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, 
should be enforced. But these would leave governments empty hands in face of 
asymmetric shocks and associated increases in unemployment. 
With fully flexible rates, the government has no incentive to recourse to the 
fiscal stimulus, given that it can only crowd-out exports in an equivalent amount. So it 
can freely follow a low deficit fiscal strategy and stimulate activity by increasing the 
money supply. This will put downward pressure on interest rates, which stimulates 
investment and tends to depreciate the currency, which in turn fosters exports, at least 
in the short run. As a partially offsetting effect, this depreciation is taken into account 
by foreign investors who require a depreciation premium. By the moment of the 
accession, the recourse to devaluation will no more be allowed, but hopefully, the 
economy would have grown enough. 
Of course, the main risk arising from an incautious recourse to monetary 
expansion is to fuel inflation. The risks are higher in those transition economies where 
soft-budget constraints are still the rule rather than the exception. In such countries, 
injections of liquidity would rapidly transform in price increases and would have little 
impact on portfolio choices. The weak response of interest rates would then explain a 
modest output increase. Thus, structural reforms and the enforcement of firm hard-
budget constraints are a basic precondition for monetary policy effectiveness. 
So far, we have shared with supporters of currency boards the implicit 
assumption that such an institution would almost eliminate the risk of currency 
attacks.  In the next section we take a critical look to this issue. 
 
                                                 
8 In a dynamic perspective, maintaining the zero devaluation policy for a long period may help 
reducing the risk, as people update their expectations downwards (Besancenot, Vranceanu and Warin, 
2000). In turn, this improves the employment performance of the economy. But a strict rule of no-
devaluation like the currency board still brings a better result. 
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4.Speculative attacks and currency boards 
4.1 First generation models: arguments pro currency boards 
A well-known explanation to currency crises under a fixed exchange rate 
regime was worked out by Salant and Henderson (1978), Krugman (1979) and Flood 
and Garber (1984). The law of one price governs the price level in the small country, 
while the price level of the foreign country is given.9 The uncovered interest parity 
also holds. These “first-generation models” postulate an exogenous increase in the 
central bank domestic credit (Flood and Marion, 1999). The subsequent increase in 
money supply puts downward pressure on interest rates and entails a capital flight. In 
order to defend the parity, the central bank must sell reserves such as the total amount 
of high-powered money is kept constant. At some moment in time, its reserves will be 
totally depleted and the fixed rate regime must be abandoned. Holders of domestic 
currency realise that the policy is unsustainable and force the exit from the fixed 
exchange rate arrangement before the moment when the reserves are completely 
depleted.10 
In the case of a currency board, the monetary base has no other counterpart 
than the reference foreign currency. Thus, such a monetary institution cannot create 
money by increasing credit to banks or to the government. In the line of the former 
analysis, many experts suggest that this institutional arrangement could completely 
rule out the risk of a currency attack. This certitude should be twice qualified. 
4.2 Currency boards, the Phillips curve and output cycles 
It may be argued that in the short and medium-run, prices in transitional 
economies are driven by the wage costs given the stance of the labour market. Indeed, 
in these economies, the productive sector is dominated by large firms, which often 
hold a monopolistic position. Such firms may form prices simply by adding a profit 
margin to unit costs. Then, for constant productivity, there is a straight relationship 
between wage and price inflation. At some moment in time, for a given level of 
unemployment, prices and wages would chase each other upward. Inflation is 
therefore positive if unemployment falls below its structural value.11 This alternative 
logic may explain a loss in competitiveness that does not build on the assumption of 
exogenous increase in central bank domestic credit. 
Starting from an initial situation with positive inflation, at some moment in 
time, domestic prices will exceed the world prices and net exports will become 
negative. As a consequence, aggregate demand diminishes and investment 
profitability deteriorates. Private capital inflows decline or are reversed. The reserves 
of the currency board begin to fall; simultaneously, the money stock is reduced. The 
equilibrium output declines further on. At some moment in time the decline in output 
should be large enough (and unemployment high enough) such that prices start to 
decline; the reverse process is at work. 
                                                 
9 Some authors part with the law of one price and write an equilibrium condition in the money market 
that establishes a positive relationship between the money stock and the domestic price level. 
10 The optimal timing requires no discrete jump in the price level (i.e. an infinite inflation rate). 
Therefore, the currency attack should occur when the actual fixed rate and the implicit exchange rate 
that would clear the market under a flexible scheme (the “shadow” exchange rate) are equal (Flood and 
Garber, 1984). 
11 This is quite a traditional explanation, which can be traced back to the paper by Samuelson and 
Solow (1960). See for a modern reference Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). 
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A simple model helps describing the mechanism more precisely. Let the price 
equation be a standard Phillips-curve: 
[ yty
tp
dttdp −γ= )(
)(
/)( ]    (1) 
where y  is the structural output, i.e. the output level associated to the structural 
unemployment rate (alternatively, one may carry out this reasoning in output growth 
rates instead of levels). Structural unemployment is related to various wage rigidities 
and frictions. Notice that in transition economies, this structural rate of unemployment 
may be quite high. 
Let us denote by R the reserves of foreign exchange of the currency board, by 
p* the price level in the EU and by e  the official exchange rate. Then, reserves will 
follow the dynamic: 
[ )(*
)(
/)( tppe
tR
dttdR −α= ]    (2) 
The equilibrium output will respond to the contraction in exports and the money stock 
according to: 
)(
/)(
)(
/)(
tR
dttdR
ty
dttdy θ=     (3) 
Thus equation (2) can be written as: 
[ )(*
)(
/)( tppe
ty
dttdy −αθ= ]    (4) 
The price level and output motion laws are solutions to the system of 
differential equations (1) and (4). One has noticed the similarity between this model 
and the famous Predator-prey model. There is a non-trivial stationary point E of 
coordinates ( yy =ˆ , *ˆ pep = ). As can be easily observed from the phase diagram 
(Figure 1), prices and output display cycles around the equilibrium point. That is, 
starting from any other initial point except the stationary point, the price and output 
solution belongs to a closed loop (one of the possible paths is depicted in Figure 1, 
where the arrows indicate the sense of motion). 
 
p(t)
0 y(t)y
dy/dt=0
dp/dt=0
ep*
_
_
E
 
Figure 1: the Phase diagram 
 
Let us imagine that policymakers have determined the initial exchange rate e  
so that the system is stable, that is, it settles at point E. Unfortunately, any exogenous 
shock to output (favourable or not) pushes the system on a circular trajectory, and 
brings about costly fluctuations. A very powerful shock may even push the system on 
a very peripheral trajectory; in this case, there may be a significant risk that such a 
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trajectory is not consistent with the condition R>0 and the currency board cannot 
survive. Of course, the dynamics put forward in this simple model depend on the 
specific form used to describe price and output formation. Other expressions may lead 
to more complex dynamics, where main variables follow explosive or chaotic paths. 
Finally, even under a currency board there is a money multiplier12 and thus a 
risk of generalised run on banks. Furthermore, this risk is somehow higher than with a 
normal central bank, given that the currency board has little possibility to act as a 
lender of last resort (Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Gulde, Kähkönen and Keller, 2000). 
As argued by Chang and Velasco (2000), currency boards make balance-of-payment 
crises less likely only at the cost of making bank crises more likely. This should be 
seriously considered by policymakers in those countries that have fragile banking 
systems – as is the case of transition economies. And as put forward by Argentinean 
experience, even a country endowed with a currency board may face major liquidity 
risks, where foreign investors may refuse to roll over outstanding debt. In this case, 
the government may be forced to default, even if the long-run condition for solvency 
is satisfied (i.e. total debt is lower than the discounted value of future primary 
surpluses). 
 
4.3 Self-fulfilling prophecies and speculative attacks 
As the French experience of the early nineties has shown, even strong 
currencies may be subject to speculative attacks. Such logic would also justify attacks 
on currencies backed by currency boards. Standard explanations (Obstfeld 1984, 
1992) develop on the logic of self-fulfilling prophecies (multiple equilibria). 
Basically, the decision to attack a currency is motivated by a large expected gain, that 
will materialise if the attack is actually undertaken. The scope for large expected gains 
results from the strong asymmetry between ex-post gains and losses of the 
speculators. Consider a speculator who borrows 1mld lei for one month and buys 
euros, while simultaneously he sells euros and buys lei in the one-month forward 
market. If at the end of that month the parity is unchanged, he will bear the transaction 
costs (and the interest rate), let say 1% of the principal. But if at the end of the month 
the leu has depreciated by 6%, the speculator will have made a 5% gain, an equivalent 
of a 60% yearly interest rate. Even if the probability of the devaluation is of 0.5, the 
domestic interest rate should increase by 30% in order to counter the attack. If the 
business sector cannot resist to this shock, devaluation is the only choice. 
Of course, the action of one isolated speculator could not destabilise the 
currency. But what is optimal for one speculator should be optimal for many others, 
depending on their specific characteristics like the information set, wealth, and so on. 
Chances that a run on the currency occurs are more significant if the country is 
globally perceived to be in a position where it cannot sustain the parity. For instance, 
if unemployment is high, the country might not be able to bear additional austerity in 
order to rebalance the current account. Unfortunately, countries in Southeast Europe 
                                                 
12 Let us assume that commercial banks hold a proportion φ of their deposits in the form of notes 
(themselves covered by dollars within the currency board): NB=φD. (For simplicity, we neglect here 
the banks deposits with the board). The public would also hold banknotes as a proportion b of their 
deposits, NP=bD. The money stock is M=N+D=NB+NP+D=(1+φ+b)D. Then, the ratio between the 
money stock and notes is m=M/N=(1+φ+b)/(φ+b) higher than 1. Thus, there is a strict relationship 
between the stock of foreign currency and the money stock. The smaller φ and b, the higher the 
multiplier is. 
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already reveal huge unemployment;13 and the accompanying social and economic 
pains will very likely be compounded when resolute steps toward the restructuring of 
their productive sector will be taken. 
Forecasts of inflation in transition economies exceeding inflation in the EU 
often build on the Balassa-Samuelson paradigm (Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997). In this 
analytical framework, the small country economy is made up of a tradable and a non-
tradable sector, with labour as the only input. Prices in the EU, the “large country”, 
are given. Under the law of one price, the prices of tradable goods in the small 
country are equal to prices in the Union, times the predetermined nominal exchange 
rate. Let us assume that this exchange rate was set initially such as the current account 
is balanced. Wages in the tradable sector can only increase in the small country when 
labour productivity increases in this sector. Then, with labour mobility between 
sectors, wages and prices in the non-tradable sector also increase, for constant 
productivity in that sector. The price level gradually increases with the catch-up in 
productivity. Of course, this kind of “adjustment” inflation would not affect the 
current account equilibrium. However, if private agents interpret the change in the 
equilibrium exchange rate as depending on relative changes in inflation rates in the 
consumer price index, they may feel that the currency is overvalued and the 
probability of speculative attacks may increase. 
Therefore, if a country opts for a fixed exchange rate regime, either a standard 
one or a currency board, it may consider the case for capital controls that dissuade 
extensive short-term capital flows and increase the opportunity costs of speculative 
attacks (Krugman, 2000). While a Tobin tax may not be effective enough in 
dissuading short-term speculation (Kenen, 1995), the mechanism proposed by 
Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz (1995) -- where foreigners who borrow domestic 
currency must constitute a one-year deposit -- could be effective. 
                                                 
13 Unemployment rates in Southeast Europe are extremely high even by transition economies standards. 
Even if the size of the underground sector is considered unemployment rates of between 30-40% (as in 
Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, etc) are staggering. 
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SECOND PART: ROMANIA UNDER SCRUTINY 
5. A basic introduction to the Romanian economic context 
From a macroeconomic perspective, Romania must solve two major problems before 
it can hope to be on the “short-list” of EU applicants. Firstly, it should bring inflation 
down radically, close to a one-digit level. With a yearly inflation rate of 40.6% in 
1998, of 55% in 1999, and 40.7% in 2000, Romania is far from matching the EU 
norm. 
Another major problem for Romanian economy is its meagre growth 
performances. From data displayed in Figure 2 it can be seen that Romania has under-
performed Central and Eastern Europe in a significant way. 
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Figure 2. Annual growth rates in Romania and average growth rates in Central and 
Eastern Europe (the Baltics excepted). 1997 to 2000. 
 Source: Economic Survey of Europe, UN/ECE, 2001. 
 
The unemployment rate also edged up, to reach a peak of 12.5 % in February 
2000, although this figure cannot be readily interpreted as bad, if it can be associated 
to much needed firm restructuring. 
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Figure 3. Unemployment rate, actual and trend (Hodrick and Prescott filter). January 
1995 to March 2001.  Source: NBR Monthly Statistical Bulletins 
 
It is also worth mentioning that the Romanian current account balance was in 
deficit throughout this period; it reached 7.4% of GDP in 1998 before the financial 
crisis, fell to 3.8% of GDP following the balance of payments adjustment of 1999, 
and stayed around 4% of GDP in 2000. In early 2001 it started to grow again 
worryingly as output picked up. This large external imbalance is a signal of poor 
competitiveness of Romanian exports, and perhaps of an overvalued national currency 
(in real terms). 
Clearly Romania has had major difficulties in achieving successful macro-
stabilisation. All through the nineties, when all other Central and Eastern European 
countries made significant progress in this respect, the situation in Romania stalled. 
How to explain this outcome? It is well known that there are fundamental 
relationships between the microeconomic structure of the economy, the institutions at 
work and the macroeconomic performances, but such a theory of comprehensive 
reform is beyond the scope of this study. We only comment on the role that the 
monetary and exchange rate mechanisms could have in improving the macroeconomic 
performance and achieve disinflation. 
6.The Romanian banking system 
A two-tier banking system was implemented in Romania at the end of 1990, 
made up of a central bank (the National Bank of Romania – NBR) and the credit 
institutions (or ordinary banks). 
6.1 Ordinary banks and the credit market 
Many of credit institutions which exist today took over the incumbent 
networks, already in operation under the central plan period. The most important 
network builds on the former local branches of the central bank itself; other networks 
come from the more specialized financial institutions, like the national investment 
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bank or the bank for development of agriculture, etc. An important role in draining 
population savings was held by a specialized institution, which maintained a 
privileged status today. The postal service also created its own banking network. It is 
obvious now that in the early years of transition, these institutions lack dramatically 
the expertise to grant and manage credits in a decentralized economy. Even now, the 
shortage of skills is a main limitation of their development. In recent years some of 
these banks were privatised (e.g. BRD in 1997, Banca Agricola in 2001), in general 
being sold to well-known foreign banks. Some new private banks were also set up, 
mostly with foreign capital. And main international banks also opened branches in 
Romania, most often in Bucharest, but, for the time being, their credit activity is 
rather insignificant, being mostly concerned with portfolio investment. While the 
number of registered banks increases every year (they were forty by the end of 1999), 
only a few of them dispose of a countrywide network. In addition, there is a notorious 
lack of payment instruments (cheques, cards, not to speak of e-banking) and the 
payment mechanism is still rudimentary (but much better now than ten years ago). In 
the light of these elements, the Romanian banking sector appears quite 
underdeveloped. According to UNECE data, in 1999, the proportion of the broad-
money stock to GDP was of only 20.7% in Romania as compared to 42% in Hungary, 
48% in Poland and as much as 71.07% in the Czech Republic (this proportion was of 
49% in the United States or over 60% in the Euro Zone). In 1999, credit as a 
proportion of GDP represented only 12.6% in Romania, as compared to 22.9% in 
Hungary, 25.9% in Poland and 59% in the Czech Republic (UNECE, 2001). 
6.2 The central bank 
The National Bank of Romania is in charge of the monetary and foreign 
exchange policy. Its statute defines the main objective of the NBR as “to ensure 
stability of the domestic currency with a view to maintaining price stability” (Law 
101/1998; Law 156/1999). Every year, the government and the NBR establish an 
inflation target, in general agreed with the IMF. For instance, the government target 
for 2001 is about 25-27%. Unfortunately, year after year, the target has been largely 
missed. 
While the leu is the only currency allowed for transactions in the domestic 
market, Romanian private agents (households and firms) may hold foreign currency 
denominated deposits with commercial banks. 
Although a foreign exchange market was created in 1992, only in January 
1997 a full-fledged foreign exchange rate market was set-up and the exchange rates 
were unified. This unification reduced the government’s room of manoeuvre for 
granting implicit subsidies via the official exchange rate.14 By 1999 there were 
practically no restrictions on capital inflows; yet, outflows by residents require prior 
approval by NBR. 
 
                                                 
14 See Daianu (2000) for a detailed analysis of the 1997 stabilisation programme. 
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Box: an unpleasant experience 
In late 1991, against the background of a tough winter, the energy producing sector (made up 
of state owned firms) run out of foreign reserves needed to purchase coal and oil, and the Government 
and the NBR imposed that foreign exchange deposits of the enterprises be converted into lei deposits at 
the official (overvalued) rate, a move that deeply affected the confidence of private agents in the 
banking sector. In order to oppose the ensuing capital flight, a full-retention regime of foreign 
exchange was introduced in mid-1992. Administrative controls over the official exchange rate were 
maintained until the end of 1996, which led to the existence of three main exchange rates: an official 
rate for firms, which was fixed by the NBR; an implicit free rate set by firms, which used linked import 
and export transactions; and another free rate, for individuals. Most of this period, the official rate vas 
overvalued; cheap energy was an indirect way to subsidise energy intensive industries, but also 
contributed to a deterioration of the current account. 
 
In mid-1999 the country faced major difficulties with the reimbursement of the 
foreign debt. The possibility of partial default was mentioned, but the crisis was 
avoided and the financial situation of the country improved soon afterwards. 
Arguably, the default was avoided due, also, ironically, to the underdevelopment of 
domestic financial markets (including the absence of a large stock of T-bills held by 
foreign investors, which can be explained by the non-functioning of a secondary 
market). In the spring of 2001, Standard & Poor improved Romania’s rating from B- 
to B. Actually, difficulties turn the other way round, as with steady capital inflows, 
some policymakers start fearing an excessive appreciation of the national currency 
that would hamper competitiveness. The good news was that the central bank was 
able to restore quite fast its reserves of foreign exchange, but at a cost (to be explained 
later on). 
7. Money, the monetary base and the base multiplier 
7.1 Some relevant stylised facts 
In general, the money stock is defined in this text as M2. This aggregate 
includes cash in circulation, checkable (sight) deposits, time and saving deposits and 
other short-term contractual savings, as well as foreign currency denominated 
deposits. There are two distinctive features of the Romanian composition of M2 with 
respect to EU countries. The first is the existence of foreign currency denominated 
deposits: private agents may and do hold dollar (or other important currency) 
accounts. The second is the relative small size of checkable deposits as compared to 
cash. As already mentioned, this latter feature is a consequence and an indication of 
the atrophy of the Romanian banking sector in general. 
The figure 4 below depicts the large increase in the money stock, which was 
roughly multiplied by a factor of seven in five years. Is this change due to an 
extensive development of bank credit, or to an increase in the monetary base with the 
NBR15? The development of bank credit may have been welcomed, as it would imply 
the development of the banking sector and the much needed financing of economic 
development. To provide an answer, we plot the base multiplier (i.e. the ratio between 
M2 and the monetary base) and the money stock M2 on the same graph. If in 1997-
1998 the multiplier was relatively high, since 1999 it has gone back to its beginning-
                                                 
15 Monetary base includes cash (bank notes and coins) and banks deposits with the NBR (also called 
reserves). 
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of-transition value of about 4.16 Clearly, the main responsible for increases in money 
stock are increases in the monetary base. 
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Figure 4. Money stock and the base multiplier. January 1995 to March 2001. 
M2 is expressed in billion lei, right hand axis. Source: NBR, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletins. 
 
7.2 The structure of the base multiplier 
However, a deeper analysis of the multiplier could be useful. Let us consider 
that commercial banks hold as reserves (deposits at the central bank) a proportion r<1 
of their deposits in lei and a proportion ρ<1 of their dollar denominated deposits. 
Banking regulation determines a minimum reserve requirement; in addition, banks in 
the developed world would hold some limited amount of excess reserves if the 
volatility of the flow of deposits were high.17 Private agents would hold cash in 
proportion b to their lei deposits, in keeping with their payment habits. They would 
also hold d lei in dollar denominated deposits for every leu deposit (we assume for 
simplicity that people would not hold dollars cash, given that they cannot use it as 
such for transaction purposes and that dollars notes carry no interest18). 
Let us denote by D the lei deposits (to simplify, we make no difference 
between demand, time and savings deposits). The money stock is M = Cash +Lei 
deposits + $deposits = bD + D + dD = D(1 + b + d). The money base is: B = Cash + 
Reserves = bD + rD + ρdD = D(r + b + ρd). The money multiplier is thus: 
 
                                                 
16 One may point at the exceptional conditions in 1997, when inflation was 151% and real money 
supply plummeted; by comparison, 1997-1998 were like an intermezzo, to be followed by return to 
what seems to be normality in Romania – a money multiplier of around 4. 
17 Minimum reserves bear an interest rate fixed on a periodic base by the NBR (e.g, 25% on reserves 
build for lei deposits in July 2001). Excess reserves are remunerated at a much lower rate (for 
overnight deposits, the interest rate was 5% in July 2001). 
18 In practice, firms and individuals would use hard currency in cash for certain transactions, even if 
this is illegal. Transactions with VISA and other credit cards often are denominated directly in dollars. 
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m = M/B = 
dbr
db
ρ++
++1  > 1. 
 
It can be seen that the multiplier is a decreasing function in b, r and ρ. That 
means that, ceteris paribus, increases in the reserve ratios would reduce the money 
stock. An increase in the public propensity to hold cash would also reduce the money 
stock. The impact of increased propensity to hold dollar denominated deposits is more 
ambiguous. The sign of the derivative: 
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is clearly positive if r≥ρ, that is if the reserve ratio that applies to deposits in lei is 
larger than the reserve ratio that applies to dollar (and euro) deposits. Since August 
1998 this condition is clearly fulfilled as the minimum reserve ratio were around 30% 
for lei and 20% for dollars (in July 2001, r=27% and ρ=20%). 
This configuration brings about additional volatility. If, for some reason, 
people lose confidence in the domestic currency, they would shift to dollar 
denominated deposits (d increases). This would raise the multiplier and the money 
supply, and would entail a decline in interest on lei deposits, which would ex-post 
validate the adverse “confidence” shock. On the contrary, if ρ>(r+b)/(1+b)>r, then 
the increase in the propensity to hold dollar deposits may have a stabilising effect in 
the event of credibility shocks. 
The figure below depicts the time patterns of the ratios b and d. 
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Figure 5. Propensity to hold cash and dollar deposits. January 1995 to March 2001. 
Here b is the ratio of cash outside banks to total lei deposits and d is the ratio of dollar 
deposits (expressed in lei) to total lei deposits. Source: NBR, Monthly statistical bulletins 
and own calculations of the authors. 
 
It can be seen that the propensity to hold lei in cash is rather stable after 1997, 
fluctuating around 0.25. But the propensity to hold dollars has increased markedly, 
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first in 1997, then after January 1999. Hence, the relative stability of the base 
multiplier in the late 1990s may be explained by a rise in compulsory and excess 
reserves. 
So, given that the money multiplier has not risen steadily (currently, it gets 
back to its “historical” value), the large increase in the money stock should be 
analysed in close relation with positive variations in the monetary base. We know that 
the monetary base responds to countervailing changes in the central bank assets. In 
the following, we take a closer look to NBR assets. 
7.3 The NBR balance sheet: asset side 
The Table 1 below shows the main posts of the asset side of the balance sheet 
of the NBR: net foreign assets (foreign assets – liabilities) also called reserves of 
foreign exchange (RFX), credits to the government (mainly Treasury bonds) and 
credits to the banking sector. Normal credits to the banking sector are made up of 
genuine refinancing credits with a pure monetary purpose, and of a special credit line. 
The genuine refinancing operations are mainly realized through repo/reverse repo 
operations with one month maturity. 
 
 Net foreign assets 
Credit to the
government
Normal credit 
to the banking 
sector 
Special credits
and other 
bank funding 
December 1995 -631 3562 4724 4552 
December 1997 11425 3271 3366 7719 
December 1999 29602 21411 2433 8696 
December 2000 65858 16176 2296 13402 
Table 1. NBR main asset positions in billions of lei. Source: NBR. 
 
As can be seen, between December 1997 and December 2000, the largest 
increases were recorded in the positions “Net foreign assets” and “Special credits and 
other bank funding”. 
These special credits deserve more scrutiny. Until 1997, state-owned banks 
often granted easy credits to various sectors (energy, agriculture, heavy industry, etc) 
and firms in trouble. They did it either following the reflexes of central planning and 
the instructions of the government, or as a result of obscure deals between their 
managers and various clients. Some banks also get involved in trouble affairs, 
financing dodgy projects, most notorious being the Bancorex case, which, after 
tearing down all its large amount of capital, accumulated large debts, then went 
bankrupt). Arguably, state support to banks  limited the risk of a generalised failure of 
a too fragile banking system. One may nevertheless suspect that some vested interests 
may have motivated this decision too. Although the government took over a large 
amount of bad debts (Bancorex, Banca Agricola), the central bank was systematically 
solicited to bail out some of the banks that went in deep financial trouble (Dragulin 
and Radulescu, 2000). Some policymakers may have lived with the illusion that the 
measure “insulates” the public deficit. Actually, it led to an almost automatic 
monetization of what normally were public expenses. In addition, the NBR was asked 
to provide small savers in the failing banks with a minimum capital. Such a huge 
amount of “special” central bank credits (10000 billion lei by December 2000) clearly 
undermined the NBR main task of fighting inflation, given that, most of the time, all 
these credits translated into a larger money supply. 
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From Table 1 it can be seen that the most spectacular increase in NBR assets 
refers to the net reserves of foreign exchange. After the 1999 mini-crisis, the central 
bank bought large quantities of foreign currency and foreign currency denominated 
assets. Today the stock of foreign reserves looks satisfactorily (Figure 7). The strategy 
of buying dollars entailed a sharp increase in the monetary base and tested the ability 
and willingness of the NBR to sterilise excess liquidity. Two factors pushed towards 
this decision: on one hand, under IMF’ nudging, Romania aimed to recover a 
“normal” stock of foreign reserves, to signal her credibility as an international 
borrower. On the other hand, NBR officials considered that the leu nominal 
depreciation was necessary in order to maintain export competitiveness. Both of these 
motivations are sensible, although one may be more ambivalent about the relationship 
between nominal depreciation and real depreciation in the high-inflation Romanian 
context, and also about the impact of a weak leu on export competitiveness in the 
long-run. It is also not very clear whether the speed of recovering the reserves was the 
most appropriate. On one hand, given the available sterilisation instruments, such a 
strong variation in NBR assets clearly brought about a huge increase in the monetary 
base; this increase fuelled the money stock and prices, and caused policy slippage 
which pushed inflation beyond its target. One can submit that a more gradual reserve 
recovery would have reduced policy slippage and better tempered inflation. On the 
other hand, in view of the recurrent emerging crises and the need to avert external 
shocks, the central bank’s obsession with rebuilding its reserve stock at a rapid pace 
did make sense. 
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Figure 7: Gross foreign assets with the NBR in US dollar equivalent. January 
1992 to March 2001.  Source: NBR Monthly Bulletins 
 
7.4. Sterilization: NBR methods 
When a central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market and acquires 
foreign currencies, it pushes towards (nominal) depreciation the domestic currency. 
But the increase in the assets of the central bank comes with an equivalent increase in 
its liabilities, more precisely of the reserves that ordinary banks held with the central 
bank. It ensues the multiplication of the monetary base, with an increase in deposits 
and the money supply in the economy. If this increase in the money stock translates 
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itself in higher prices, in real terms the depreciation rate can be smaller than the 
nominal depreciation and may even turn into real appreciation. A country that runs a 
large current account deficit may wish to prevent this outcome. In this case, the 
central bank must block the increase in monetary base. It thus have to simultaneously 
carry out a sterilization operation, where it offsets the initial increase in reserves of 
foreign exchange (or net foreign assets) by a reduction in other counterpart of the 
monetary base. Let us examine a (very) simplified balance sheet of a “standard” 
central bank, like the Fed or the ECB: 
 
Balance sheet of a “standard” central bank 
Assets Liabilities 
RFX       +1 N 
REF 
(a)          −1 
R           +1 
              −1 
TB 
(b)          (−1) 
 
 
On the asset side, we have RFX, the reserves of foreign exchange, REF for 
ordinary banks refinancing (or credit to the banking sector) and Treasury bonds held 
by the Central bank. On the liability side, we have N, the bank notes in circulation and 
the reserves R, i.e deposits of the ordinary banks with the central bank. 
If the Central bank buys dollars in amount of 1 local currency unit, reserves 
and assets increase. To counter the increase in reserves, two methods are usually 
utilized: (a) the bank may simultaneously sell Treasury bonds (this is the Fed 
privileged way) in the same amount, or (b) it may reduce the credit to the banking 
sector (REF) (this is the ECB preferred way). Both operations will lead to a unit 
reduction in the reserves (R). 
But let us turn back to the contemporary situation of the NBR. As we know, 
after the summer 1999 crisis, the NBR augmented dollar assets in a rapid and 
accelerated way. In order to prevent the increase in the monetary base, it was bound to 
sterilise this intervention. 
Could the NBR have used the above-mentioned usual tools? Obviously, it 
could not have reduced refinancing, insofar Romanian refinancing of the banking 
sector is quite small, and is mostly related to non-monetary operations, where some 
banks received special credits to help them restructuring. It neither could sell 
massively Treasury bonds, first of all because the stock of Treasury bonds is quite 
small compared to foreign exchange reserves, and because there was quite little 
appetite for these bonds. 
So the NBR used another method, where the NBR borrows resources from the 
ordinary banks. This operation is called “deposit-taking”, or attracting deposits, and 
can be seen as the reverse of a refinancing operation.  So far, the average duration of 
these operations were of one month, but the tendency is to lengthen them. In this case, 
the simplified balance sheet of an ordinary bank looks as: 
 
Balance sheet of bank i 
Assets Liabilities 
Ri Di 
Ai REFi 
Ci  
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The bank holds reserves with the central bank (Ri), lends to private agents (Ci) 
and lends resources to the central bank (Ai). Di are the deposits of private agent with 
this bank. Some ordinary banks have also benefited from restructuring credits or 
normal refinancing credits, denoted by REFi. 
The balance sheet of the NBR is : 
 
Simplified balance sheet of NBR 
Assets Liabilities 
RFX       +1 N 
REF R           +1 
             −1 
TB A           +1 
 
On the liability side, we have now total central bank borrowing from ordinary 
banks, in the amount A. We also have explained why the NBR has little margin for 
altering REF. Hence, in order to sterilize the increase in reserves, a 1 leu increase in 
RFX must be balanced by 1 leu increase in A (or a 1 leu reduction in TB).  
If the initiative for buying dollars stays with the NBR, the initiative for lending 
money to the NBR stays with the ordinary banks. To be sure that the banks want to 
lend money, the NBR must offer an interest rate on these deposits higher than the 
interest rate that banks can obtain from lending in the private market. So far, the 
spread was about 10 percentage points. 
Has the NBR carried out an effective sterilisation policy? Let us take a closer 
look to the figures.19 From the trough of April 1999 to April 2001, net foreign assets 
increased from 15600 billion lei to 82300 billion lei. In the meantime, net refinancing 
(genuine repo reverse/repo – attracted deposits) barely varied around 2000 billion lei. 
Only in October 1999, average outstanding attracted deposits rose sharply from 3000 
billion lei to 7500 billion lei. But, throughout the year 2000, the NBR made little use 
of this tool. However, the reduction in the stock of Treasury bonds by over 5000 
billion lei between December 1999 and December 2000 (Table 1) may be interpreted 
as an attempt to sterilise. The NBR seems now eager to recourse again to the deposit-
taking weapon, as, between March 2000 to February 2001 it increased by 6000 billion 
lei the average stock of attracted deposits. 
So, if the NBR wants to push toward the real depreciation of the leu, it should 
continue to buy dollars and sterilise this intervention by attracting more and more 
deposits. Assuming that the bank has enough resources to pay the high interest rates 
needed to attract these deposits, what does such a policy entail? By offering high 
interest rates on attracted deposits, the NBR crowds out credits to the productive 
sector. While depreciation favours exporters, higher interest rates may harm 
investment, thus firms that produce for the domestic market face only the adverse 
effect. The aggregate effect is ambiguous. 
 
8.The exchange rate policy 
Since 1997 the leu fluctuates against the major currencies in a free market 
where the NBR intervenes as any other trader. However, the volume and the 
frequency of the transactions of the NBR in the foreign exchange market exceed what 
we normally can see as specific to a managed float regime. In mature market 
                                                 
19 Such as published in the Monthly Bulletin 4/2001 of the NBR. 
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economies, the central bank resorts to interventions in the foreign exchange market 
only in exceptional cases, and tries to influence the exchange rate by monetary policy, 
in particular by managing short-term interest rates. But given that in Romania the 
Treasury bonds market is quite thin and the banking sector does not demand 
refinancing credits, the central bank has limited control over market determined short-
term interest rates. So, at a first sight, it seems that if the NBR wants to alter the 
international value of the leu, it can (and should) rely on direct transactions in the 
foreign exchange market. Let us take a closer look to this reasoning. 
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the real exchange rate of the leu relatively to 
the US dollar since 1992. During the early years of transition, there was a general 
tendency of real appreciation of the leu. To a certain extent, such an evolution is 
consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson paradigm20, but an excessive appreciation 
would hamper export competitiveness. The structural current account deficit of 
Romania throughout the last decade would point to such a weakness. Moreover, the 
major difficulties faced by Romania in 1999 followed a period of sharp real 
appreciation, and the recovery was accompanied by depreciation. So, what matter for 
economic performance is not the dynamics of nominal, but of real exchange rates. In 
low an inflation environment the difference is not so sharp; but Romania is not a low 
inflation environment. 
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Figure 8. Real dollar-leu exchange rate index, base 1.00 in December 1991. The trend 
builds on Hodrick and Prescott filter. Price variation builds on consumer price indexes 
in Romania and the US. Source: NBR and US Bureau of Labour Statistics 
 
 During the 1999 crisis, the NBR, instead of raising interest rates, bough lei 
massively (and sold reserves, as shown in Figure 7). This may have limited the size of 
the devaluation, but at the cost of a rising default risk on foreign debt due to reserve 
depletion. 
                                                 
20 A note of caution should be kept in mind since rationing accompanied the functioning of the official 
foreign exchange market until early 1997. 
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9.More empirical evidence on the devaluation – inflation relationship 
Let us consider more in depth the factors that contributed to the steady 
nominal devaluation of the leu. In Figure 9, it can be seen that the nominal exchange 
rate has evolved in pair with prices in the goods market. 
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Figure 9. Nominal exchange rate and CPI Indexes (base 100 in December 1991). 
January 1992 to March 2001. Source: NBR 
 
But has the leu depreciation been a major cause of price inflation or, as 
elementary monetarist logic would imply, the nominal devaluation only reflects, with 
a lag, the price increase? A Granger causality test tends to corroborate the former 
hypothesis, indicating that exchange rate hikes lead the rise in prices. But the 
monetarist logic is not completely falsified. A similar test run this time on inflation 
and money growth rate shows that the money growth rate also leads the price increase 
(see Appendix A for the two tests). 
Of course, a theory of inflation for economies with a distorted microeconomic 
structure and lack of basic institutions like the Southeast European ones is difficult to 
work out. Therefore we limit ourselves to a basic empirical approach and develop a 
simple VAR model, considering the interplay between changes in prices, changes in 
the money stock and changes in the nominal exchange rate. Data are monthly, in the 
interval 01:1997 to 03:2001. We did not consider earlier data, as the exchange rate 
was not fully liberalized. Equations of the model are presented in the Appendix. 
The response of the inflation rate to a shock in the money growth rate (DRM) 
and in the devaluation rate (DVN) is depicted in the figure below. As can be seen, a 
one standard deviation impulse in the former variables entails significant inflation 
acceleration (up to 1.5% per month inflation increase). The maximum impact is 
reached with a three-month lag for devaluation and a four-month lag for money. It 
takes some one-year to the system to return at the pre-shock equilibrium. 
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Figure 10. The impulse function. Response of monthly inflation rate to one standard 
deviation shock in the monthly money growth rate and in the devaluation rate. On the 
horizontal axis: number of months after the shock. 
 
This simple AR model is instructive as it points to the high speed of 
transmitting nominal shocks in the Romanian economy. In mature monetary 
economies, money shocks need over six months to translate into higher prices. In 
Romania, the first impact can be observed only two months later. 
This would point to a source of ineffectiveness of the NBR policy of managing 
real exchange rates by systematic interventions in the foreign exchange market over 
the 1997-2000 period. If the central bank buys dollars in an attempt to depreciate the 
leu, it simultaneously increases the money stock, which, two months later, already 
brings about higher inflation. In this context, the real depreciation is hard to be 
achieved. The massive recourse to sterilization is the only chance to block the 
increase in the money stock. 
 
10.Conclusion and policy implications for Romania 
Romania’s macroeconomic performance can be termed so far as 
disappointing: the country has not been able to deliver steady growth, low 
unemployment and low inflation. Many factors are microeconomic and can be related 
to the slow progress with firm restructuring, privatisation and institution building. In 
the text at hand we have taken these important constraints as given, to focus on the 
effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate mechanisms and policies The National 
Bank of Romania has been, so far, unable to carry out a consistent monetary policy, 
which should defeat high inflation. Under quite unfavourable circumstances and 
various pressures (frequently of a political nature) it has often provided easy credit to 
“sensible” sectors and dodgy commercial banks. Such quasi-fiscal operations have 
been a resilient feature of NBR’s activity throughout the decade. At some moments, it 
also financed directly public deficits, in contradiction with the price stability goal. 
And it still carries out frequent and large interventions in the foreign exchange 
market, notably as a dollar buyer after 1999, another policy that leads to monetary 
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base ballooning. We know that after 1999, sterilisation has become a major concern 
for the NBR, but it did not fully neutralise the increase in reserves of foreign 
exchange. This happened, seemingly, since the NBR programmed relatively high 
inflation targets (a substantial expansion of base money), and focused on a rapid 
recovery of foreign exchange reserves. The NBR’s original sterilisation instrument, of 
deposit-taking, was utilised in various moments, and its effects were felt, especially, 
in the aftermath of the 1999 crisis. Now, the NBR has more than recovered the pre-
crisis foreign exchange reserves and may cease buying dollars. This would limit 
further increases in the monetary base. But the NBR may wish to keep on buying 
dollars in order to force the real depreciation of the leu, in the context where 
Romanian current account deficits look too high. We know that in the long-run, 
export competitiveness may be gained only through firm restructuring and 
productivity gains. But in the short-run, real depreciation may help export-oriented 
firms to compete in the world market. In order to achieve this target and 
simultaneously fight inflation, sterilisation should be carried out much more 
vigorously than in the past. But this points to the risk of pushing interest rates higher, 
and crowding out domestic investment. Favouring export-oriented firms may harm 
domestic-oriented ones. Unfortunately, the aggregate effect of the policy is 
ambiguous. A better policy would involve a solid disinflation package, which would 
trigger re-monetisation, less sterilisation pressures and a competitive exchange rate in 
relation with productivity gains. 
Therefore, what should be done to improve the operation of monetary policy 
in order to engage the disinflation process? Quite importantly, NBR monetary policy 
would have to be unburdened of quasi-fiscal operations. There has been substantial 
progress in this respect in recent years, but more has to be done. The central bank 
management should be insulated in his current tasks from any inference from the 
Parliament and the Government even if, quite normally, the NBR has to be fully 
accountable to the political representatives with respect to the achievement of the 
assigned objectives. 
The NBR acquired a new constitution in recent years and new rules for 
conducting operations in money and capital markets were established in late April 
2000. Although these rules contain a comprehensive list of instruments, most of them 
cannot be utilised in an efficient way in the Romanian context, characterised by an 
undeveloped banking sector and a thin market for Treasury bonds. 
Indeed, the success of monetary policy management in Romania rests to a 
large extent with the banking sector. The contemporary situation, where for restricting 
the monetary base the central bank must become a net borrower from ordinary banks, 
points to the underdevelopment of the banking system, and to its incapacity to finance 
the productive sector.21 Time is needed to develop credit banks networks, to build 
infrastructure and acquire skills. And with time will also emerge trust between banks, 
their lenders and borrowers. Trust and expertise are basic preconditions for the credit 
market to take off. And then the NBR may be able to extend its repo financing of the 
banking sector, and thus set up a powerful mechanism for managing short-term 
interest rates. This is a long-term process, and it may take the full decade 2001-2010 
to have it implemented. 
Monetary policy reform should be embedded into a coherent policy-mix to be 
set up simultaneously; the latter would include incomes policy and low budget 
deficits, themselves grounded in a tight control and streamlining of public spending 
                                                 
21 This may also signal the lack of worthy investment projects. 
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and the imposition of financial discipline on firms and households. Ceteris paribus, 
high deficits come with high interest rates, and call for a laxist monetary policy to 
offset this effect, though this policy has major pitfalls in an open economy. More 
competition in the goods and labour markets as well as effective anti-trust measures, 
by curbing the market power of dominant blocks of suppliers, would also work 
against additional and unwarranted price increases. 
As an upshot, there is a dual challenge for the NBR, for monetary policy, in 
order to subdue inflation: to control liquidity (base money) effectively and to break 
powerful inflationary expectations after years of almost “programmed inflation”. But 
expectations react to monetary policy changes. As long as major policy changes are 
not implemented, either because there is no political will or because of the lack of 
institutions and infrastructure, there can hardly be a decisive change in expectations. 
 
 
What would be the suitable exchange rate mechanism to accompany the 
reform of monetary policy? 
a) Should Romania give up an autonomous monetary policy and adopt a 
currency board? A currency board would, by its internal structure, put an 
end to quasi-fiscal operations and deficit monetization: both these actions 
have poisoned NBR activity in the nineties. Under a currency board, the 
scope for devaluation is almost negligible, especially if the choice of the 
initial parity is rigorous. However, the behaviour of the money stock is less 
predictable. If the only way to acquire foreign exchange reserves consisted 
in running a trade surplus, the scope for a destabilising outcome is very 
limited; a sustained trade surplus implies more money, higher prices and 
less competitiveness, which has an adverse effect on exports. But 
additional foreign exchange reserves may be brought by massive capital 
inflows, related to direct investment but also to more speculative 
investment. Such an institution is therefore not a “miracle” solution and its 
implementation would come with new risks. It may leave the country 
defenceless to adverse shocks that may hit the economy prior to EU 
integration. While it contains the government spending fervour by ruling 
out deficit monetization, it may favour excessive borrowing from abroad. 
This could lead to speculative lending and asset price inflation, with major 
financial risks. Even under a currency board, speculative attacks on the 
currency could occur, especially if the currency seems overvalued. In 
addition, potentially high real interest rates associated to a large foreign 
debt may strain fragile banks overwhelmingly. 
b) A flexible exchange rate may avoid the accumulation of nominal 
imbalances and may provide for the needed flexibility to adjust to adverse 
shocks. The main advantage for Romania of implementing a genuine fully-
fledged flexible exchange rate regime is its simplicity. This would allow 
policymakers to focus on short term goals as limiting the monetary base 
growth and stabilising the base multiplier. Whatever the objective of the 
central bank, low inflation or a stable exchange rate, a successful anti-
inflation policy calls for a severe tightening of monetary policy today. A 
tough monetary policy may come with some increase in interest rates and a 
currency appreciation, which will bring about an additional favourable 
impact on curbing inflation. The main shortcoming is a risk that the real 
appreciation entails a reduction in export competitiveness. True, in the 
 28
long run, this may force firms to restructure and increase productivity. But 
in the close future, this policy may push out of the market an excessive 
number of firms, in the context where the Romanian economy is already 
very weak. 
c) Should Romania adopt a crawling peg/gliding band (against the euro) 
combined with an efficacious disinflation policy? To be effective, this 
policy change requires that (a) the Central Bank has all the political 
autonomy and technical ability to pursue such a policy, (b) an appropriate 
depreciation rate target is set, and, (c) in general, mutually consistent 
policies are adopted in the fiscal and structural realms. As the devaluation 
rate should not be lower than the inflation rate, sterilisation would be 
systematic, to prevent the excessive increase in the money stock. 
Simultaneously, one may consider the implementation of “soft” capital 
controls, essentially aimed at dissuading speculative attacks (Eichengreen, 
Tobin and Wyplosz, 1995; Krugman 2000). Finally, a public body should 
monitor the foreign debt of commercial banks and firms, in order to rule 
out excessive private borrowing in foreign exchange. Such prudential 
norms would limit the adverse impact of devaluation, via a balance sheet 
effect (Krugman, 2000). Of course, by the moment when the economy 
takes off and inflation is cut to normal values, the crawling peg/gliding 
band regime could be replaced by a flexible one (as did Poland in 2000). 
 
Our analysis has put forward some relevant elements of an analysis of the 
monetary and exchange rate policies in Romanian transition economy. The 
improvement of these policies is essential for achieving disinflation and sustainable 
growth. In the light of this paper, it appears that subduing Romanian inflation is not 
an easy, but it is a possible task. Most of our conclusions point toward the necessity of 
a gradual disinflation endeavour. 
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 Appendix A. Main econometric tests 
1. Granger causality tests: 
Sample: 1997:01 2001:03 
Lags: 4 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  DVN does not Granger Cause INF 51  31.7794  3.3E-12 
  INF does not Granger Cause DVN  1.74375  0.15843 
 
Sample: 1997:01 2001:03 
Lags: 4 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  DRM does not Granger Cause INF 51  5.45475  0.00125 
  INF does not Granger Cause DRM  0.24376  0.91183 
 
 
2. The VAR ESTIMATE 
 Included observations: 51 
 Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses 
 DRM INF DVN 
DRM(-1) -0.269374  0.113136  0.540687 
  (0.17023)  (0.08314)  (0.20360) 
 (-1.58239)  (1.36074)  (2.65569) 
    
DRM(-2) -0.125972  0.089478  0.263304 
  (0.18591)  (0.09080)  (0.22235) 
 (-0.67758)  (0.98542)  (1.18418) 
    
DRM(-3)  0.094973  0.190977  0.429138 
  (0.17674)  (0.08632)  (0.21138) 
  (0.53737)  (2.21242)  (2.03021) 
    
DRM(-4) -0.170300  0.121228 -0.243264 
  (0.19578)  (0.09562)  (0.23414) 
 (-0.86988)  (1.26783) (-1.03895) 
    
INF(-1)  0.531374  0.113846  1.153003 
  (0.29812)  (0.14561)  (0.35655) 
  (1.78240)  (0.78187)  (3.23376) 
    
INF(-2)  0.210050  0.439586 -0.394660 
  (0.29914)  (0.14610)  (0.35777) 
  (0.70218)  (3.00876) (-1.10312) 
    
INF(-3) -0.040200  0.080365 -0.547886 
  (0.31606)  (0.15436)  (0.37800) 
 (-0.12719)  (0.52061) (-1.44943) 
    
INF(-4)  0.083056 -0.166512 -0.174799 
  (0.16214)  (0.07919)  (0.19392) 
  (0.51225) (-2.10269) (-0.90141) 
    
DVN(-1)  0.187730  0.370855  0.642119 
  (0.14123)  (0.06898)  (0.16891) 
  (1.32921)  (5.37628)  (3.80146) 
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DVN(-2) -0.451075  0.088373 -1.122129 
  (0.19446)  (0.09497)  (0.23257) 
 (-2.31967)  (0.93050) (-4.82496) 
    
DVN(-3) -0.060201 -0.337543  0.324704 
  (0.23174)  (0.11318)  (0.27715) 
 (-0.25978) (-2.98230)  (1.17157) 
    
DVN(-4) -0.022689 -0.006829  0.285285 
  (0.21980)  (0.10735)  (0.26288) 
 (-0.10322) (-0.06362)  (1.08523) 
    
C  3.544747 -0.325308 -0.393529 
  (1.39562)  (0.68163)  (1.66914) 
  (2.53992) (-0.47725) (-0.23577) 
 R-squared  0.243440  0.877572  0.652183 
 Adj. R-squared  0.004527  0.838911  0.542346 
 Sum sq. resids  595.7297  142.1075  852.1244 
 S.E. equation  3.959432  1.933823  4.735433 
 F-statistic  1.018948  22.69895  5.937736 
 Log likelihood -135.0439 -98.49720 -144.1715 
 Akaike AIC  5.805642  4.372439  6.163588 
 Schwarz SC  6.298069  4.864865  6.656014 
 Mean dependent  3.752162  4.347059  4.175222 
 S.D. dependent  3.968424  4.818189  6.999887 
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Annex 
The NBR Dilemma : a Theoretical Approach 
In the 1997-2000 period, the National Bank of Romania faced the dual 
challenge of stabilizing inflation and avoiding currency crises. Unfortunately, it was 
not favored by circumstances. a thin market for treasury bills, an underdeveloped 
banking and financial sector and a low demand for credits compelled authorities to 
combine interventions in the currency market with a sui generis and costly 
sterilisation policy in order to keep money supply under control. In order to underline 
the central bank’s dilemma in pursuing the two mentioned goals it is useful to 
consider its task by decoupling, at this stage, currency market interventions of 
sterilisation. The simple model below presents the Central bank dilemma in the light 
of this decoupling. 
Notations: 
Rt , central bank reserves of foreign exchange 
it , nominal interest rate (domestic) 
ρ t , depreciation rate of the leu against the dollar (ρ  > 0 means that the leu is 
depreciating). 
           ϕ t , risk premium over real interest rates at home, compared to world 
rates 
π t , probability of default on foreign debt (private of public) 
r , world interest rate in real terms (equivalent to nominal interest rates, if 
world inflation rate can be neglected) 
β , central bank policymakers discount factor. 
We assume that purchasing power parity holds, thus the Leu devaluation rate 
is equal to the inflation rate; in turn, inflation is equal to the money growth rate. 
Assuming a stable monetary base multiplier, the money stock increases proportional 
to dollar reserves, thus: INF R R
Rt t
t
t
= = t−+ρ 1 , or else 1 + INF R
Rt t
t
t
= + = +1 1ρ   
The default premium  
The net foreign exchange income of the country is submitted to random 
shocks. The net income is modelled as a random variableε t , symmetrically 
distributed around zero, and following a single peaked statistical distribution 
(with a c.d.f. ). The risk that at some f () F()
 
moment in time the country cannot face its external obligations is denoted by 
π t where:  
π t =  Pr ε t R< − t                                   
                                                               = 1−F Rt( )                                                      
(1) 
 
where  are central bank reserves.  Rt
If the dollar net outflow exceeds bank reserves, the country is in a situation of 
default. To simplify, we assume that when the default occurs, it is complete, that is 
foreign debt value becomes zero. Then, under the assumptions of perfect capital 
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mobility, risk neutral investors and no inflation abroad, we can write the zero trade-
off condition for dollar denominated assets:       
                        1 + r
i
t
t t
= + + − t
RST
                                0 with probability 
 with probability (1
π
ρ( ) / ( )1 1 π )                                     
(2) 
                                              
 or:    
                                                1
1 1
1
+ = + −+r
it
t
( )( t )π
ρ                                                             
(3) 
 
which leads to:  
                                                1
1 1
1
+ = + +−i
r
t
t
t
( )( )ρ
π                                                             
(4) 
 
After replacing π t  by expression (1), the previous equation becomes: 
                                                1
1 1+ = + +i r
F Rt
t
t
( )(
( )
)ρ
                                                            
(5) 
 
and, taking the logarithmic approximation:  
                                                i r f Rt t t≈ + −ρ log ( )                                                            
(6) 
 
Given that INFt = tρ , the premium of the domestic real interest rate over the 
world one can be written as:  
                                                
ϕ ρt t t
t
t
i r
r r
F R
= − −
−
−
 
    =  
    =  log 
( )
( )
                                                                 
(7)                                                                                               
 
where log and is an increasing function in . F Rt( ) ≤ 0 Rt
 
           The objective of the central bank 
           The Central bank wants to create an economic environment conducive 
to growth and to keep inflation under control. Growth may be achieved through low 
real interest rates, which stimulate consumption and investment. Therefore, in a linear 
form, the single period objective of the central bank is: 
 
                                               O at t t= +ϕ ρ                                                                   
(8)  
 
where the parameter  tunes the relative weight of the two goals; when 
 no attention is paid to activity (the policymaker is inflation-averse); a large 
a ≥ 0
a = 0
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implies that the policymaker wants to lower the premium, and a = 1 means that equal 
weights are set on the two objectives. 
tR
 log a F
R
R
t
t
− OQP
+1
2
t tR( )
( )
0
In an intertemporal perspective, the objective becomes: 
 
V t t
t
=
=
∑β
0
O                                                                          (9)                              
where β ≤ 1 is the discount factor of central bank policymakers. While β = 1  implies 
that policymakers have no preference for the present, a short-sighted policymaker will 
have a very low β . 
Given that ϕ t tF R= − log ( )  and ρ t t
t
R
R
= −+1  we can write the 
intertemporal  objective:                              
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The optimal policy 
As already mentioned, the control of foreign exchange reserves is the only 
instrument into the hands of the central bank. Minimization of V implies the central 
bank choosing an optimal time-path for . Starting from a situation where reserves 
are low, the risk is quite large. But if the central bank buys large amounts of dollars in 
order to push down the risk  
Rt
premium, it will increase the monetary base and inflation will take off. This is 
clearly a policy dilemma; the solution is an optimal pace of dollar reserves increase. 
There is a first order condition dV dRt t/ = 0  : 
 
                                 dV
dR R
a
f R
F Rt
t
t
t t
t
= + −LNM =
−
−
β β1
1
1 0
( )
( )
                                        
(12) 
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Denoting the elasticity of the c.d.f. by ηF
t
R f
F R
=  and given that 
R
R
t
t
t
+ = +1 1 ρ : 
≥
 
                                           
− = + − +− −a F t tβη β ρ ρ( ) ( )1 11 1                                               (14)  
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This leads to an equation for inflation acceleration (first difference in inflation 
rates): 
 
                                           
ρ ρ η ββ ρ1 1 1
1 1 0− = − + − + >− −t F ta ( )                                       (15)  
 
The ''steady state'' inflation rate is obtained for ρ ρ ρt t= =−1 $  such as defined 
by: 
 
                                                    
$ρ η ββ= − −a
F
1
1                                                               (16)  
 
Whenever ρ ρt− <1 $  inflation keeps on rising, while for ρ ρt− >1 $  inflation 
decelerates. 
But inflation builds on an increase in reserves. As is decreasing in , 
steady state inflation 
ηF Rt
$ρ  is also decreasing in . At some point, inflation becomes 
zero: central bank reserves 
Rt
R∗  associated to zero inflation are implicitly defined by: 
 
                                                    
η ββR
F t t
t
R f R
F R a*
( )
( )
= = −
∗ ∗
∗
1                                                     (17)  
 
Whenever a shock pulls central bank reserves out of this equilibrium point, the 
system will converge toward this point, in keeping with equations (15) and (16). In 
the first step, inflation accelerates until the steady state is achieved, then inflation falls 
as reserves increase. 
 
The dynamics implied by this simple model can be likened to stylized facts 
observed in Romania during the last few years, with the caveat that sterilisation has to 
be brought back into the picture with a view of understanding why inflation did not 
get out of control. Financial strain in 1999 led to higher inflation than in the previous 
year. In 2000 a sort of a steady state value was achieved, and now we observe a 
gradual process of convergence towards an optimal reserve value, with a gradual 
decrease in inflation rates. Sterilization policy (via attracting deposits from banks), 
which is not captured by this model, was not insignificant during these years, and it 
did avoid a rise in money velocity which would have fuelled inflationary expectations 
dangereously.  
Sterilisation tempered money creation and inflation, but at the expense of a 
premium over interest rates, which was needed in order to attract ordinary bank 
deposits. An optimal sterilization policy might be inferred from this trade-off, given 
the decision problem of the central bank. 
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